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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we shall study differential games of survival using the 
notions of strategy and payoff introduced in [l] to study differential games 
of fixed duration and in [2] to study differential games of generalized 
pursuit and evasion. We assume that the reader is familiar with [ 1,2] and 
shall freely use concepts, notations, definitions, etc., introduced there. 
Formulated intuitively, the game that we shall study here has its state 
x(t) at time t determined by the system of differential equations 
where u(t) E Y is chosen by Player I at each instant of time t and v(t) E 2 is 
chosen by Player II at each instant of time t. The payoff is 
(1.2) 
where 4 is the solution of (1.1 ), t, is the first time that the trajectory 
(t, 4(t)) reaches some preassigned terminal set 6, X, = &t,), and g is a 
function defined on y. 
We shall show that under appropriate conditions on the data of the 
problem, if the Isaacs condition holds, then the game of survival has a 
continuous value. We shall also show that if the function g is Lipschitz 
continuous and the boundary of 9 is C’, then the value function is 
Lipschitz continuous and its upper and lower directional derivates satisfy 
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the relations in [3]. From these relations it follows, as in [3], that the 
value function is a viscosity solution of the Isaacs equation and that at 
points of differentiability the value function satisfies the Isaacs equation. 
2. ASSUMPTIONS AND NOTATIONS 
As noted in the Introduction, we shall use the notation established in 
Section 2 of [ 11. In addition, we shall let .c = (x0, x) and shall let 
f= (fO, f) = (fO, f’, ‘.., .f”). 
Assumption I. (i) The function f is continuous on 9 - [To, T] x 
R” x Y x Z, where To and T are fixed and Y and Z are fixed compact sets in 
Euclidean spaces. 
(ii) There exists a constant K> 0 such that for all t E [To, T], x, X 
in R”, YE Y, and ZEZ, 
Ifk x, y, z) -fk 2, Y, z)l d Klx- 4. (2.1) 
(iii) The function g: (t, x) + R is continuous on [To, T] x R”. 
Assumption I’. Statements (i) and (ii) are as in Assumption I, and (iii) 
is replaced by (iii)‘: There exists a constant K’ such that for all t, i in 
[To, T] and all x, X in R”, 
Ig(t,x)-g(i,x)l<K[jt-il+Ix-xl]. 
Note that from (2.1), the continuity of f, and the compactness of 
[To, T] x Y x Z, it follows that there exists a constant B > 0 such that for 
all (t, x, y, z)E~, If(t, x, y, z)l d Kjxl + B. Thus, if Assumption I holds, 
then Assumptions I of [ 1,2] also hold. 
Assumption II is concerned with the terminal set. 
Assumption II. Let F, be a closed domain in (To, co) x R” with C’(‘) 
boundary 8F,. At each point (t, x) E F, let (v,, v) be the normal to aF, 
pointing to the exterior of F1. Let 
minmax[v”+(v,f(t,x, y,z))]<O 
ZEZ ytY 
minmax[~~+(v,f(t,x,y,z))]<O. 
.“SY zaz 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
Let F denote the intersection of F, with the slab To f t d T, and let F be 
bounded. Let the terminal set y be given by r = F u ([T, CO) x R”). 
Assumption II’. Let F, be as in Assumption II and let 
F,~([T,co)xR”).LetF=F,andlet.~=F. 
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Remark 2.1. Condition (2.2) guarantees that Player II can terminate 
the game whenever the trajectory is close to 9, while condition (2.3) 
guarantees that Player I can terminate the game. 
It will also be clear to the reader as he or she follows our development 
that the condition f” 2 0 imposed in [2] can be replaced there by (2.3) to 
give another set of conditions ensuring the existence of value. 
Let p be a vector in R”. Define 
H+(t,x,p)=n~inmaxCf”(f,x,y,z)+(p,f(t,x,y,z))l 
_ .L’ (2.4) 
Hp(4x,p)=maxmin CS”(~,x,.hz)+ (p,f(4x, ,w)>l, ,’ z 
where the max is taken over y in Y and the min is taken over z in 2. We 
say that the Isaac3 condition holds at a point (t, x), if for all p, 
Hf (t, x, p) = HP (t, x, p). In this event we denote the common value by 
H(f, -x, P). 
3. DEFINITION OF GAME 
Let (ro, x0) with (to, x0) # F be an initial point of the game. A strategy r 
for Player I on the interval [to, T] and a strategy A for Player II on the 
interval [to, T] are defined as in [ 11. Corresponding to [r, A) we obtain a 
sequence of controls (u,,, un) and a sequence of nth stage trajectories 
@J ) - (cpjj, cp,) satisfying 
with (xz,, xOn) -+ (0, x0). A motion @[ , to, x0, f, d] is a uniform limit of 
nth stage trajectories 4,( , to, xOn, u,,, u,). 
As in [2], by the capture time t,-” of the nth stage trajectory cp,( ) we 
mean the first time such that (1, q,,(t)) belongs to F-. The capture time t/of 
a motion 4[, to, x0, x0, f, A] is defined similarly. 
The payoff P(t,, x0, I-, A) resulting from a pair of strategies (r, A) is 
defined as 
f’(to, xo, r, A)= 0 { g(t,, q[tr, to, xo, r, Al) 
+ (P’C+, to, xo, r, Al )> 
where the union is taken over all motions @[ , to, x0, f, A] resulting from 
(r, A). Note that tl. in general will be different for different motions, As in 
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[2], we shall designate the game just defined as “the game G” or “the game 
G( t,, x0)” when we wish to call attention to the initial position. We denote 
the upper value of the game by W+(t,, x0) and the lower value by 
W- (t,, x0). Thus 
W+(t,,x,)=infsupP(t,,x,,r,d) 
A r 
W-(t,,.u,)=supinfP(t,,x,,r,d). 
r 3 
If we introduce a zeroth coordinate x0 by means of the state equation 
dx’/dt = f”(t, x, I?, z), then our game G(t,, x0) can be considered as a game 
in [T,,T] xR”+’ with initial position (to, 0, x0), with terminal set Y x R, 
and with payoff function 
g( Cf, 2.1.) = g( Cf, Xf) + XT. 
If we vary (to, x,,) and also vary the initial value of x0, we embed our 
family of games G(t,, x0) in a family of games &to, a,). If I$‘+ (to, a,) 
denotes the upper value of @to, a,) and Pf-(to, a,) denotes the lower 
value of @to, a,), then 
@*(t,,~i-,)= W+(t,,x,)+x~. (3.1) 
4. THE EXISTENCE OF VALUE 
THEOREM 4.1. Let Assumption I hold, let Assumption II or II’ hold, and 
let the Isaacs condition hold at all points of [To, T] x R”. Then the game of 
survival has value for all initial positions (to, x0) in 
B=(([T,, c~)xR’)-.F)u(&Y), 
and the value is continuous on B’. 
(4.1) 
We first prove the theorem under the assumption that g -0. We 
introduce the functionsfO, as in [2] and consider the games G,(to, x0) as in 
[2]. As in [2], we denote the upper and lower values of G&to, x0) by 
w+cto, x0, PL). 
In Lemma 4.3 of [2] we established the following fact: Given a compact 
set +Z in 9, there exists a constant C > 0 such that for all (to, x0) in %? and 
all ~1 sufficiently small 
w- (to, x0) 2 w  (to, -x0> p) - cp. (4.2) 
The arguments used to establish Lemma 4.3 of [2] carry over word for 
word to the problem at hand. (On page 368 of [2], after Eq. (4.20) we 
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pointed out that f E 2 0. The statements that follow are clearly valid for 
arbitrary f E. ) 
If we interchange the roles of y and z and use condition (2.3), the 
arguments used to establish Lemma 4.5 of [2] will establish the following 
statement. 
Let (K A) be strategies in G and let @[ , t,, x,,, I-, A] be a motion with 
capture time t/. Then for each 0 <p < puo, where p,, is a constant indepen- 
dent of (f, A) and (to, x,), there exists a r* = T*(T, A, @[ 1) and a motion 
GAI[ , t,, x0, r*, A] in the game G, such that for t, < t < t,- 
and 
@Cc to, xo, r, Al = @,Ch to, .xo, r*, Al (4.3) 
c~‘(+, to> xo, r, Al 6 (P;CT, to, xc,, T*(T), Al + Cp, (4.4) 
where C is a constant independent of f, A, p and the motion @[ 1, but 
dependent on the compact set %? of initial conditions. 
Fix A in (4.4). We get 
sup cp°Ct,, to, x0, ~,~ld~~pcp~C~,~o,x,,~*(~),~l+C~ 
r r 
d sup (P;CK to, xo, r; Al + CP, 
P 
where P is an arbitrary strategy for Player I over [to, T]. If we now take 
the inlimum over all A we get 
W+(to, x0) < W+(G), x0, pL) + c/A (4.5) 
where (4.5) is valid for all 0 < ,U <p. and all (to, x0) in the compact set %?. 
We showed in [2] that if the Isaacs condition holds for the game G, then 
it also holds for the game G,. Hence by the results of [l] for games of 
fixed duration, W+(to, x0, p) = lV(t,, x0, p). We denote this common 
value as l+‘(t,, x0, ,u). It now follows from (4.2) and (4.5) that for all 
(to, x0) in %’ and p sufficiently small, 
W(to, x0, p) - cp d w-(to, x0) d w+tt,, x0) 
d wto, -ql, p) + cp. (4.6) 
If we now take lim sup as p -+ 0 on the left and lim inf as ,D -+ 0 on the 
right, we obtain that W+(to, x0) = W-(to, x0). 
From (4.6) we now get 
-ccl d Wtoxo) - W(fo, x0,11) G CP 
409.129.2-13 
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for all (to, x0) in %Z. Hence W(t,, x0, p) --) W(to, x,,) as p -+ 0, uniformly for 
(t,, x0) in %?. Since for each p, W( to, x0, cc) is continuous on V, we obtain 
that W is continuous on %. From this, the conclusion of Theorem 4.1 
follows when g = 0. 
We next consider the case in which g is Ct2). We can assume without loss 
of generality that g(t,, x0) = 0. Then the payoff (1.2) can be written as 
i ” Ck!,(S? cpb)) + (D&Y cp(S))> fh cp(s), 4sh u(s))) 10 
+.I-“h cp(s), u(s), 4s))l 4 
where 4 is a solution of (1.1) and Dg= (ag/ax’, . . . . ag/axn). Thus, if g is 
Cc2), the game G can be written as a game i: with g z 0 and the functionf’ 
given by 
y”(t, x, Y, z) = s,(h x) + (Dg(t, xl, f(h x, Y, 2)) +f’(c x, Y, 2). (4.7) 
It is immediate to verify that if G satisfies the Isaacs condition, then so 
does G. For initial points (to, x0) in a compact set 59, all solutions of (1.1) 
will lie in a fixed compact set @ in [To, T] x R”. Since g is C’*’ on 
[T,, T] x R”, the function ydelined in (4.7) will satisfy a uniform Lipschitz 
condition in x on @, Since we need only confine our attention to &?, we can 
redefine g outside of B so that (ii) of Assumption I holds. Conditions (i) 
and (iii) of Assumption I clearly hold for the game G. Thus, by the result 
established when g = 0, the theorem holds when g is Cc2). 
If g is continuous and ?.3 is a compact set containing (to, x0), then there 
exists a sequence of C”’ functions g,, on [To, r] x R” such that 
/ g,(t, x) - g(t, x)1 < l/n for all (t, x) in B. Let P, denote the payoff in the 
game G,(to, x0) with initial point (to, x0) and with g in (1.2) replaced by 
g,. Then for any r, d and (to, x0) in 9J 
P,(to, x0, r, A)- l/n< P(t,, x0, r, A)< P,(to, x0, r, A)+ l/n. 
Since the games G, have values W,,, it follows that for (to, x0) E g 
WJfO, x0)- l/n d w- (to, x0) G w+ (to, x0) 
d W,(to, x0) + l/n. (4.8) 
If we now take lim sup as n -+ co on the left and lim inf as n --) 00 on the 
right, we obtain that the value W(to, x0) exists on 93. From this and from 
(4.8) we now conclude that W,,(to, x0) + W(r,, x0), uniformly on 53. Since 
the values W, of the games G, are continuous, it follows that W is con- 
tinuous on 93, and hence on [To, T] x R”. The proof of Theorem 4.1 is 
complete. 
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5. THE LIPSCHITZ CONTINUITY OF THE VALUE 
Let 
W=([T(), co)xR”)-5. (5.1) 
Thus, ,!%!. = 9 - 8Y-, where W is as in (4.1). 
LEMMA 5.1. Let Assumptions I’ and II’ hold. Let X’ be a compact set in 
R” and let TO < t < T be such that the set {t > x X’ c &‘. Then there exists a 
constant K > 0 such that for all such t and all x, x’ in X’, 
IWk(t,x)+ W’(t,x’)l<Klx-x’l. (5.2) 
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Lemma 5.1 and 
Theorem 4.1. 
COROLLARY 5.1. Zf the Zsaacs conditions holds, then for t, x, x’ as in the 
statement of Lemma 5.1 
1 W(t, x)- W(t, x’)l <Klx-x’l. (5.3) 
We will show that (5.2) holds for the lower value W-. A similar 
argument shows that (5.2) holds for W+. The proof will be carried out 
under the assumption that f” = 0. We reduce the case f" & 0 to the 
case f"=O by introducing a zeroth coordinate as described in the 
last paragraph of Section 3. The result will follow from Eq. (3.1). The 
idea of the proof is the same as that of the proof of Theorem 5.4.2 in 
Friedman [4]. The details are different because of the differences in the 
definitions of the games. 
Let z E [To, T] be such that {r } x X’ c 8 and let 5 E 3’. Then for every 
E > 0, there exists a strategy f, defined in [T, T] such that for all f and all 
motions (PC, T, 5, r,, Al, 
Since we are now assuming that Assumption II’ holds, the set (8F) of 
[2] is the set as, the boundary of Y. Since we shall refer to the arguments 
of [2], we shall keep the designation $F. As in [2], for a point (t, x) in 
[to, T] x R”, we let p(t, x) denote the signed distance of (t, x) to 8F, with 
negative values assigned to points (t, x) in the interior of F. For E > 0 we let 
(8F), = {(t, x): To < t < T, Ip(t, x)1 <E}. We let 
F, = ((1, x): (t, xl E F, I&t, x)l < 14. (5.4) 
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Let 
A(6 x3 Y, z) = P,(h x) + <DP(f, x), f(t, x, L’, z)>, 
where Dp = (apja.x’ , . . . . aplaY), and let y*(t, x) be an element in Y such 
that 
max A(t, x, v*(t, x), 2) =min max A(t, x, y, z). 
b i 
We now define a strategy I-,*, which is a modification of r,. Let 
r, = {Ten} and let A = (A,,} be an arbitrary strategy for Player II. Let 
(n,} be a sequence of partitions of [to, T] and let Z7, have partition 
points r=z,<z,< ... <z,=T. Let Ii= [zip i,r,), i=l,..., II. Let t,,, 
denote the capture time of the nth stage trajectory cp( ,T, <,, u,, r,), where 
t,,-+ 5 and (u,, u,) is the outcome of (r,,,,, A,). Let k= k(n) denote 
the integer such that r,: n E I,, 1. Let r,* = (rz ,,}, where rz, = 
u-h, 1, . ..) c... ) is defined as follows. For j = 1, f,T n, , = r,, ,2, , . 
For 2Bjdk+ 1, let 
r;.,j(g,~x,~ . . . XT.-, X~,J 
=rE,JqxXIX ..’ xq~,xq~,). 
Let j> k + 1. For i = 1, . . . . j- 1, let u,, , E ?Z, u,, i E ZZi, and for t E I, let 
u’,(t) = u,,, i(t) and v:(y) = u,, Jt). Then U: and u; are controls on [r, TV- ,) 
and they determine an nth stage trajectory cp,*( ) = cp,*( , T, r;, u;, vi) on 
[T,T~-~). If (T],,, ~*(T,~,))E(~F)&~, where E~>O is as in the proof of 
Lemma 4.4 of [2], let 
(~rl:n,i(~,,l,U,,,l,...r %I,,- I7 u,,,,-l))(t) 
= Y*(Tj- 12 V,*(T.j- 1)) 
for all [El,. If (Tj-- ,, cp,*(z,-,))$(aF),z2, let 
Note that if (u,*, u,*) is the outcome of (r:,,, A) and (un, u,) is the 
outcome of (r,, n, A,,), then for zdtdt,, 
V,*(h T, t,, U,*, u,*) = cP,,(h T, 5, u,, 5,). 
The arguments used to establish Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 of [2], with proper 
changes in the roles of A* and r,*, can now be used to establish the 
following. 
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LEMMA 5.2. For every E > 0, there exists a strategy I-: for Player I, a 
constant p0 > 0, and a constant C independent of p, A, and < in a compact set 
Xb, such that for every A and every motion q[ , z, 5, r:, A], 5 E %A, 
g(tf> cpCt/, 7, 5, CT, A])2 W-(T, 5)-&, (5.5) 
and the time t, = t,(r,*, A, r) at which (p[ , T, 5, r,*, A] exits the set F,, 
defined in (5.4), satisfies 
t - tp < cp. (5.6) 
The proof of Lemma 5.1 also requires the following result. 
LEMMA 5.3. Let X0 be a fixed compact set in R”, and let E and p0 be 
as in Lemma 5.2. Let { E ?&. For any motion q[ ,T, 4, r:, A] let 
(t, X) z (i, cp[t]) E (i, cp[i, z, t, r,*, A]) be a point such that 
0 < p( i, q[ i] ) < ,a, where ,a < ,uO. Then there exists a constant C, , indepen- 
dent of 5 and p, such that at each of the points (i, R) of dF that are nearest to 
(it 3, 
g(f, i) 3 w- (5, 4) - & - cp. (5.7) 
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Let cp,( ) = cp,( , r, r, u,, v,) be the sequence of nth 
stage trajectories converging to (p[ 1. Then for all n sufficiently large, 
0 < p(i, q,(i)) < p. We modify A to the right of i by means of the forcing 
function z* as in Section4 of [2]. Denote the modified strategy by A*, 
denote the modified nth stage trajectories by cp,*( ), and denote the capture 
time of cp,*( ) by tfn. Relation (4.9) of [2] is valid here with t, = i and 
t = tf. n. Thus 
P(tL cp,*(t;,)) = p(i, cp,*(tO) 6 E(n) - A($, - OP. (5.8) 
There exists a subsequence of {cp,*}, which we relabel as {cp,*}, which 
converges to a motion cp*[ ] = cp*[ , r, 5, r,*, A*]. Note that for r 6 t d i, 
(p*[t] =q[t]. Let t? denote the capture time of cp*[ 1. If we now let 
n --f co in (5.8) we get that ( tf- i) < C’p for some C’ > 0, independent of 5 
and ,u. We therefore also have Ix/* -Xl z I’p* [tj+] - (p[t] 1 d A,n, for some 
constantA>O.Since I(i,X)-(i,i)l<p,itfollowsthat I(t,*,xF)-(i,.i)Id 
B,u for some B > 0. From the last inequality and the Lipschitz continuity of 
g, we get that g(f,z?)>g(t/*, (p*[tF,z, &r,*, A*])-C,p for some C,>O 
independent of CL, i; E?&, and A. The lemma now follows from the last 
inequality and from (5.5). 
We return to the proof of Lemma 5.1. Let u and v be controls such that 
u(t) E Y a.e. and v(t) E 2 a.e. on [r, 7’1. Let cp( , <) denote the solution of 
502 LEONARD D. BERKOVITZ 
(1.1) with these controls and initial condition cp(r, 5) = 5. It follows from (i) 
and (ii) of Assumption I’ and from a standard argument involving 
Gronwall’s lemma that there exists a constant K’ > 0 and a 6, > 0 such that 
if 5 and l’ are points in the compact set E with 14 - 5’1 < bO, then 
Iq(t, <) - cp(t, (‘)I BK’ 15 - 5’1 for all r < t d T. Moreover, the constants 6,, 
and K’ are independent of the controls (u, u) used. Therefore, for any 
strategy A for Player II and any pair of motions (p[ , 2, [, r:, A] and 
(PC, 7, t’, C, Al, 
IvCt, 5, 5, C, Al - cpCt, 7, t’, CT, All G K’lt - 5’1 (5.9) 
for all t in [r, T], provided l&j - (‘1 6 6,. We may also take 6, to satisfy 
K’6, < /A(). 
Consider any motion q[ , r, l’, r,*, d] and any motion q[ , z, 5, r,*, A]. 
Denote the capture time of the first motion by !r and denote the capture 
time of the second motion by t, 
First consider the case in which srk tp Let 
psK’I<-[‘I. (5.10) 
Then p < K’ 6, <p,,. By Lemma 5.2, the motion (p[ , q 5, r,*, A] will exit 
the set F, defined in (5.4) at a time t, that satisfies (5.6). It follows from 
(5.9) that at time t, the motion (p[ , T, <‘, r,*, A] is in the set F,. Hence 
sr< t,, and by (5.6) 
tf< Sf< tf+ c/l. (5.11) 
Setrp[]~~[,,,5,r,*,d]andsetcp[]rcp[,2,5’,r,*,A].Then 
I(+ d&l) - (ff, f-PCffl)l 
G I(qv cpc~flHtf7 @afl)l + I(tp mfl)-(tf, cpctfl)l. 
It now follows from (5.9) and (5.11) that 
I(+ cpc~flH~f~ 4ofl)l QK”l5-4’19 (5.12) 
for some constant K” > 0 independent of A, provided 14 - <‘I < 6,. 
Since g is Lipschitz continuous, it follows from (5.12) and (5.5) that 
there exists a constant K> 0, independent of A, such that for 15 - (‘1~ 6,,, 
and all A, 
g(+ VOCS~, 7, e, c, 02 w-(7, 5)-~-J95-5’1. (5.13) 
Next consider the case sr< t,. By virtue of (5.9) and the condition 
K’~,-=PCl, the point (sf, cp[sfl I= (sf, cp Cq, 5, L r,*, A I) satisfies 
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0~ p(s,, cp[sr]) <p, where p is as in (5.10). Hence, by Lemma 5.3, 
condition (5.7) holds at the point (i, 2) of al; that is nearest to (sr, cp[sY]). 
The distance from the point (s,-, Cp[sY]) = (s,-,cp[.sf, r, C;‘, r,*, A]) to the 
point (i, k?) is less than or equal to 2~, since (s,, @[sf]) is at a distance less 
than or equal to p from (sf, q[.s/l), which in turn is at a distance less than 
p from (f, 2). Since g is Lipschitz continuous, g(s,, C~[S~]) 2 g( i, 2) - C”p 
for some C” > 0, independent of p, 5, and A. It now follows that (5.13) also 
holds, with R possibly redefined, if sr< tf 
Since (5.13) holds for all A, regardless of the position of 3,. with respect to 
tr, there exists a constant R> 0, independent of E, such that for all E > 0, all 
l E X, and all r’ satisfying 15’ - 51 < 6,, 
W-(7, C’)> W-(7, 5)-&-Kl(-y1. 
Since E > 0 is arbitrary, this relationship holds with E = 0. The preceding 
argument with the roles of 5 and 5’ reversed gives W-(t, 5) 2 
W- (7, 5’) - RI c - t’l. Lemma 5.1 now follows from the last two inequalities 
and the compactness of 3. 
THEOREM 5.1. Let Assumptions I’ and II’ hold and let the Isaacs con- 
dition hold. Then the value W satisfies a uniform Lipschitz condition on 
compact subsets of &. 
Theorem 5.1 follows from Corollary 5.1 by the arguments used in [S] to 
show that Lipschitz continuity in x implies Lipschitz continuity in (t, x). 
6. OTHER PROPERTIES OF THE VALUE FUNCTION 
Let L be a real valued function defined on a set CT,,, T) x G, where 
CT,, T) is an interval in R and G is an open set in R”. Let h be a vector 
in R”. 
DEFINITION 6.1. The upper Dini derivate of L in the direction (1, h) at 
the point (t, x) in [TO, T) x G is denoted by D + L( t, x; 1, h) and is defined 
by 
D+L(t, x; 1, h) = lim sup [L(t + 6, x + 6h) - L(t, x)] 6-l. 
610 
The lower Dini derivate of L in the direction (1, h) at the point (t, x) in 
[T,, T) x G is denoted by D-L(t, x; 1, h) and is defined as above with 
lim sup replaced by lim inf. 
If L is differentiable at (1, x), then for every h in R”, 
D+L(t, x; 1, h)=D-L(t,x; 1, h). If we denote this common value by 
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DL(t, x; 1, h) we have DL(t, x; 1, h) = L,(t, x) + (L,(t, x), h). The number 
DL(t, x; 1, h) is the directional derivative of L in the direction (1, h) at 
(4 x). 
The arguments used in [3] to establish the analogous results in games of 
fixed duration and in games of generalized pursuit and evasion will 
establish the following theorem. 
THEOREM 6.1. Let Assumptions I’ and II’ hold. Let h = (ho, h), where 
h’ER’andhER*. Thenforeach(t,x)inR 
max min [h’+D-W--(t,x; l,h)]<O 
,‘t Y  6~ FJr, x. L,) 
min max [hO+D’W+(t,x; l,h)]>O, 
.EZ LtF,(r. *,:i 
(6.1) 
where F,(t,x,y)=co{f(t,x,y,z):zEZ} and F,,(t,x,z)=co{f(t,x,y,z): 
ye Y). 
If the Isaacs condition holds, then W is a viscosity solution of 
u, + H( t, x, D,) = 0 on B 
46 x) = s(4 x) on as, 
where D, = (au/ax’, . . . . au/ax”) and H( t, x, p) is as defined in Section 2. 
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